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ABSTRACT—As class action settlement funds become more and more
prevalent, cy pres awards have become a more common means of
providing relief to absent class members. The primary purpose of cy pres
awards is to provide a second-best form of relief when it is deemed
impossible to directly compensate individual plaintiffs. Most often, these
cy pres awards are given to some kind of charitable organization. Under
federal law, class action settlements and cy pres awards are governed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). Rule 23(e)(2) requires all class
action settlements to be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” but provides no
further guidance. Thus, federal courts look to judge-made standards to
determine the validity of a cy pres award. Numerous states have codified cy
pres laws with specific requirements into their statutory schemes. Every
state has an unclaimed property law. Both the state cy pres statutes and
unclaimed property laws may conflict with federal law. This Note will
examine how a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction would and
should respond where state and federal law conflict. In so doing, it will
discuss the interplay of cy pres doctrine, the Erie doctrine, the Rules of
Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act. This Note concludes by
examining the proposal by the Rule 23 Subcommittee on Civil Rules to
codify cy pres in Rule 23(e) and the Subcommittee’s subsequent
withdrawal of the amendment. This conduct bolsters the conclusions that
that a Rules Enabling Act analysis is more appropriate for these cy pres
questions, and that federal cy pres awards may indeed violate the Rules
Enabling Act.
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INTRODUCTION
As class action settlement funds become more and more prevalent, cy
pres awards have become a more and more common means of providing
relief. Cy pres comes from the French expression cy pres comme possible,
which means “as near as possible.”1 Thus, the purpose of cy pres in the
class action context is to provide a second-best alternative form of relief
when direct compensation of absent class members is not possible.2 Most
notably, cy pres awards generally refer to any class action award given to
charitable or other nonprofit organizations that have a purpose related to
the underlying cause of action.3 The use of cy pres awards as a tool to

1

WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12.32 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2016).
2
Id.; see also Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres
Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 452 (1972) (suggesting that uncollected damages in a class action can
be distributed to the “next-best” use based on the cy pres doctrine).
3
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1; see also Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements,
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3241, 3250 (2015) (discussing cy pres in the context of class action settlements
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distribute class action funds is extremely controversial.4 Critics suggest that
attorneys and judges abuse cy pres distributions by dispersing the funds to
causes completely unrelated to the cause of action, even to causes that are
tied to the attorneys or judges.5 Supporters, on the other hand, argue that cy
pres awards serve the interest of class members by approximating a related
alternative to individual compensation while still deterring misbehaving
defendants.6
The debate reached a climax with Chief Justice Roberts’s comment in
denying certiorari in Marek v. Lane.7 He wrote that, at some point, the
Supreme Court should address “when, if ever, [cy pres] relief should be
considered.”8 In April 2015, seemingly in response to Chief Justice
Roberts, the Rule 23 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules (“Rule 23 Subcommittee” or “Subcommittee”)9 released a report
suggesting an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Federal
Rule” or “Rule”) 23(e),10 which would add specific guidelines for
approving cy pres remedies in a settlement agreement.11 Although the Rule
23 Subcommittee ultimately decided to remove the cy pres amendment

and noting that cy pres can refer to the distribution of leftover settlement funds to a charity or to a
settlement that designated a charity as a recipient of funds at the outset).
4
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1; see also Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres
Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA.
L. REV. 617, 641–51 (2010); Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1014, 1021–36; George Krueger & Judd Serotta, Our Class-Action System
Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB121798040044415147 [https://perma.cc/PAT5-SRP7]; Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s
Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26bar.html
[https://perma.cc/MJ4E-ZRMJ].
5
Cecily C. Shiel, Note, A New Generation of Class Action Cy Pres Remedies: Lessons from
Washington State, 90 WASH. L. REV. 943, 945 (2015).
6
Wilber H. Boies & Latonia Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue and Cy Pres Awards:
Emerging Problems and Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 267, 269–70 (2014).
7
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
8
Id. at 9.
9
The Rule 23 Subcommittee is responsible for “becom[ing] fully informed about pertinent issues
regarding Rule 23 practice . . . [and] keeping an eye out to identify pertinent developments and
concerns.” See RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1 (Apr. 2015), https://classactionblawg.files.
wordpress.com/2015/04/rule-23-subcommittee-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JWE-KPNK] [hereinafter
APRIL 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. The Subcommittee releases memoranda “to share with
the full Committee the content and fruit of the Subcommittee’s recent discussions . . . [and] present[]
conceptual sketches of some possible amendments” to Rule 23. Id. at 2.
10
Rule 23 defines the rules for class actions, and Rule 23(e) describes the rules for “Settlement,
Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise.” FED R. CIV. P. 23(e).
11
See APRIL 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 23–24. For a detailed
discussion of the proposed amendment, see infra Part V.
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from its current reform agenda,12 cy pres awards are likely to stay in the
public eye given Chief Justice Roberts’s comments and growing scholarly
criticism.
This Note, unlike previous scholarship on cy pres as a class action
remedy, frames the discussion by examining whether a federal court sitting
in diversity jurisdiction should apply federal or state law in determining the
validity of a cy pres award as part of a class action settlement agreement.
First, Part I of this Note discusses the history of cy pres law. Then, in Part
II, this Note examines current choice of law doctrine. Based on current
doctrine, it explores the tests federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
might apply to determine whether to permit cy pres settlements in
accordance with federal law when the federal law conflicts with state law.
The critical question that courts must answer to perform this analysis is
whether federal cy pres doctrine is derived from Rule 23(e) or is a product
of federal judge-made common law. Based on the Court’s Erie line of
cases, as this Note discusses in Part III, it is likely that courts will
determine that judge-made common law controls cy pres doctrine. Thus,
courts will use a Rules of Decision Act13 analysis. However, in Part IV, this
Note argues that the more appropriate approach, in light of Justice Scalia’s
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.14 opinion in
2010, is to examine cy pres law as derived from Rule 23(e). If courts were
to take this approach, they would conduct a Rules Enabling Act15 analysis
and likely conclude that federal law should apply. Part V concludes that the
Rule 23 Subcommittee’s proposal to codify cy pres awards as a part of
Rule 23(e) is a tacit acknowledgment that class action cy pres settlement
remedies are in fact derived from Rule 23, even though the Subcommittee
withdrew the recommendation. In fact, as Part V suggests, the very fact that
the Subcommittee withdrew its proposal lends credence to the idea that cy
pres remedies in class action settlement agreements may violate the Rules
Enabling Act.

12

See
RULE
23
SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT
4,
46–47
(Nov.
2015),
http://
www.classactioncountermeasures.com/files/2015/10/2015-1105-Rule-23-Subcommittee-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DWY-GSL7] [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2015 RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
13
The Rules of Decision Act states that “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
14
559 U.S. 393 (2010) (plurality opinion).
15
The Rules Enabling Act provides the Supreme Court the power to prescribe the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and states that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”
§ 2072(b).

1100

111:1097 (2017)

Cy Pres Awards and the Erie Doctrine

I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CY PRES

This Part will discuss the development of cy pres law. First, this Part
will discuss the original use of cy pres awards in the law of trusts. Then,
this Part will discuss the development of cy pres doctrine in the realm of
class actions. Finally, this Part will discuss modern federal courts’ use of cy
pres awards as a class action remedy.
A.

The Historical Origin of Cy Pres in Trust Law

The doctrine of cy pres has a long, historical background. It originated
as a tool used in trust law to honor a testator’s charitable gift as best as
possible when it was impossible to honor the testator’s specific intent.16 It is
not totally clear where the legal concepts surrounding cy pres began, but
evidence points to the Roman Empire.17 The Digest of Justinian, a
collection of Roman law, directed that gifts left by the deceased intended to
celebrate games that had become illegal instead be put to some legal use to
honor the deceased’s memory.18 Later, England adopted the concept of cy
pres as an aspect of trust law, motivated by importance of charities and the
role of the church.19 When honoring a charitable trust became impossible,
the gift instead would be designated to a purpose that closely approximated
the original intent of the testator.20 In England, there were two distinct types
of cy pres: judicial and prerogative.21 Under judicial cy pres, the chancellor
was responsible for determining the original intent of the testator and
ensuring that the ultimate recipient of the gift honored that intent.22 On the
other hand, the king exercised prerogative cy pres with broad discretion
and could designate charitable gifts to causes only loosely related—or
sometimes completely unrelated—to the donor’s original intent.23 Both
France and Spain also adopted cy pres as part of their civil law.24

16

EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.00, at 1 (1950).
Id. § 1.02, at 3.
18
Id. § 1.02, at 3–4.
19
Id. § 1.03, at 4; see also Hamish Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres
Principle in Charities, 33 B.U. L. REV. 30, 32–33 (1953) (noting that cy pres developed based on a
presumption in favor of charity, and that charity in medieval England was “largely confined to the
Church”). Often, the chancellor who exercised cy pres also was an official of the church, and suggested
“property not specifically disposed of should be used by the executors for the good of the testator’s
soul.” Id. at 33; see also id. (“[T]he motive of the testator in making bequests to charitable uses was
closely linked with his own concern for the future of his soul.”).
20
A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 305 (1939).
21
Id. at 303.
22
Id. at 304–05.
23
Id. at 305.
24
FISCH, supra note 16, § 1.03, at 4.
17
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In America, courts originally rejected use of cy pres in trust law; this
rejection was motived by a fear that courts would have too much power and
that the chancellor would use cy pres to benefit his own social and religious
views rather than staying true to the donor’s original intent.25 Eventually,
state courts affirmed cy pres to preserve charitable trusts, and currently,
nearly every state has codified cy pres in trust law by statute.26 In general,
courts only apply cy pres to enforce a charitable trust when: (1) the gift is
in fact a valid charitable trust, (2) it is impossible or impracticable to honor
the original gift, and (3) the testator had some “general charitable
intention” to make the gift.27 Because the third requirement necessitates
courts to judge the intent of the testator, a difficult if not impossible task,
some states have modified or eliminated that factor.28 In the latter half of
the twentieth century, trust law cy pres doctrine crossed over into the class
action context.
B.

The Development of Class Action Cy Pres Doctrine

In 1966, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee dramatically altered
Rule 23.29 Most notably, the new Rule states that in nonmandatory classes,
absent class members are presumed to be a part of the class unless they
proactively opt out.30 As a result, leftover funds from class-wide awards
and class-wide settlements have become a common occurrence.31 Absent
class members who never affirmatively join a class in the first place
sometimes never claim their portion of the award, thus leaving a portion of
the fund unclaimed.32 For example, in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co.,33 $32 million of a $100 million settlement was unclaimed.34

25

Jennifer Johnston, Comment, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything is Possible: How Cy Pres
Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 277, 280 (2013).
26
Redish et al., supra note 4, at 628 & n.59 (citing the statutes of forty-six states and the District of
Columbia).
27
FISCH, supra note 16, § 5.00, at 128.
28
Redish et al., supra note 4, at 629–30 (noting, for example, that the Pennsylvania legislature
removed the intent requirement, the Connecticut Supreme Court eliminated the intent requirement, and
in Massachusetts the intent requirement is presumed to be satisfied absent clear alternative intent).
29
See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 356 (1967).
30
Redish et al., supra note 4, at 630; see FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B).
31
Johnston, supra note 25, at 281.
32
This often is the case when the damage awards are so small that individual absent plaintiffs are
not sufficiently incentivized to fill out and mail the paperwork required to claim their part of the award.
See Redish et al., supra note 4, at 631.
33
314 F. Supp. 710, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1971).
34
Johnston, supra note 25, at 281 (citing Pfizer, 314 F. Supp. 710).
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Traditionally, unclaimed class action settlement funds have simply
reverted back to the defendants, but such a result was criticized because it
decreased the deterrent impact of civil litigation on defendants’ activities.35
A 1972 student comment by Stewart Shepherd was the first to suggest an
alternative: cy pres awards in the class action context.36 Shepherd suggested
that unclaimed funds could be distributed to the “next-best recipient” in a
process “analogous to the doctrine of cy pres.”37 To distribute leftover
funds through use of a cy pres award, he argued, courts should attempt to
determine alternative recipients whom the legislature would prefer, trying
to stay as true as possible to the legislature’s intent.38 He suggested three
approaches: “(1) distribution to those class members who come forward to
collect their damages, (2) distribution through the state in its capacity as
parens patriae or by escheat, and (3) distribution through the market.”39
Although Shepherd acknowledged that the best option was to distribute the
funds to injured parties, he argued that “[a]s it becomes more difficult, or
even impossible, to ascertain which alternate recipients the legislature
would prefer, it may be appropriate to devote the funds to a broader public
service in order to maximize the benefit to society.”40 In 1987, new
scholarship suggested that an acceptable “next best” form of compensation
was a donation to a charity or nonprofit organization that is at least loosely
related to the class members’ injuries.41

35

See Redish et al., supra note 4, at 631.
See Shepherd, supra note 2, at 452.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 453; see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12.32 (“The class action analogy is strained but
works by assuming that the court, as when it redirects a settlor’s money from one set of beneficiaries to
another, is simply redirecting money from one set of beneficiaries (absent class members) to an entity
whose interests lie ‘as near as possible’ to that group—namely, a charity working on issues related to
the group’s underlying causes of action—rather than have the monies revert to the defendant.” (footnote
omitted)).
39
Shepherd, supra note 2, at 453. Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by which a government has
standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen.” Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). Escheat is the “[r]eversion of property . . . to the state.” Escheat, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
40
Shepherd, supra note 2, at 452–53.
41
Redish et al., supra note 4, at 633–34 (noting that under this theory of cy pres, unclaimed funds
would be formed into a charitable trust to be donated to an existing charitable organization or used to
create a new charitable foundation); see also Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective
Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1605 (1987); Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The
Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 759 (1987).
36
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C.

Class Action Cy Pres Awards in Federal Courts

In modern American law, federal courts use cy pres doctrine as a
remedy in the class action context under two related but distinct scenarios.
First, a cy pres award can be used when, after funds from a settlement are
distributed to the class members, excess funds remain in the original
settlement pot.42 The excess funds are often a consequence of failing to
locate absent class members, absent class members failing to file their
claims, or absent class members failing to cash their checks.43
Alternatively, excess funds may result when it is economically
impracticable to send awards to absent class members.44 This most
commonly occurs when individual damages are so low that the
administrative costs of sending the funds are greater than the value of the
individual awards themselves.45 Second, cy pres remedies included as part
of settlement agreements themselves have become more and more
common.46 In these instances, the plaintiff class and defendant agree, as
part of the settlement, that a portion of the settlement money will go to a
designated charity.47
The first use of cy pres as a tool for determining a class action remedy
in the federal courts came in Miller v. Steinbach48 in 1974. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that there was no
precedent for or against a cy pres award as a portion of a settlement
agreement and that a cy pres award would “certainly not . . . benefit those
on whose behalf the action was brought.”49 Nevertheless, because
“individual recoveries would be de minimus by almost any standard,” the
court approved the settlement agreement—including the cy pres award—
noting that “no alternative [was] realistically possible.”50 Since Miller, no
clear judicially enforced standard has developed to determine the validity

42

Shiel, supra note 5, at 950.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See Redish et al., supra note 4, at 653.
47
See Johnston, supra note 25, at 284 (“In its modern form [cy pres] permits the distribution of
funds to uninterested parties before there are even any residual funds left over.”); see also
Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3250. Although Professor Bartholomew attempts to distinguish
charitable settlements—in which a charity is chosen to receive money as part of the settlement—from
other cy pres awards, she acknowledges that no other scholar has made that distinction. Id. This Note
will consider charitable settlements as a form of cy pres.
48
No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974).
49
Id. at *2.
50
Id.
43
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of cy pres awards.51 Instead, cy pres awards have been evaluated somewhat
inconsistently under both the requirements of Rule 23(e) and judge-made
common law.52 According to Rule 23(e), the court must approve class
action settlements,53 and for settlements to be upheld, they must be “fair,
reasonable, and adequate.”54 However, the Federal Rules do not specify a
judicial standard for determining whether a settlement passes the Rule
23(e) test, and to fill this void, federal courts have created common law
requirements.55
The Supreme Court first addressed cy pres awards as a class action
remedy in 2013. In Lane v. Facebook, Inc.,56 plaintiffs filed a class action
against Facebook. They alleged that Facebook violated their privacy rights
as a result of the Beacon program, which updated Facebook members’
profiles based on actions the members took on websites that contracted
with Facebook.57 The parties agreed to a $9.5 million settlement; $6.5
million took the form of a cy pres award to a new charity organization to
provide education on online privacy law.58 Notably, Facebook’s Director of
Public Policy was one of three individuals selected to serve on the board of
directors of the new organization, and counsel for Facebook sat on the
organization’s Board of Legal Advisors.59 Thus, because Facebook
maintained significant control over the cy pres recipient—the new charity
organization—there were serious concerns about the award and a potential
conflict of interest.60 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the settlement, holding that
the settlement as a whole—including the cy pres award—was
“fundamentally fair,” satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(e).61 The court
held that it was both infeasible to provide monetary payments to the absent

51

See Shiel, supra note 5, at 951; see also Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3256 (noting that courts
have a “great deal of judicial discretion” in considering the validity of cy pres awards, leading “to
inconsistent decisions over similar charitable settlements”); Goutam U. Jois, The Cy Pres Problem and
the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 258, 263 (2008) (noting that “courts are
free to do almost anything with undistributed class funds,” leading “to a system that is ad hoc,
unpredictable, unguided by any normative principle, and open to the possibility of abuse”).
52
For a discussion on the implications of the determination as to whether class action cy pres
awards are controlled by Rule 23(e) or judge-made common law, see infra Parts III–V.
53
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
54
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
55
See infra Section III.A.
56
696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom.
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
57
Id. at 816.
58
Id. at 817.
59
Id. at 817–18.
60
See Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 133 (2014).
61
Facebook, 696 F.3d at 825.
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class members and that there was a sufficient nexus between the
organization and the harm that the plaintiffs suffered.62 Judge Andrew
Kleinfeld dissented and asserted that the settlement failed to meet the
“higher standard of fairness” required to satisfy Rule 23(e).63 Judge
Kleinfeld was concerned about the incentive for collusion, as he noted that
“there [was] nothing to stop Facebook and class counsel from managing the
charity to serve their interests.”64
Even though the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Chief Justice
Roberts took the unusual step of issuing a statement from the bench, stating
that when a more suitable case presents itself, the Court should consider
“when, if ever, [cy pres] relief should be considered” and should “clarify
the limits on the use of such remedies.”65 Specifically, Chief Justice
Roberts was interested in examining “how to assess . . . fairness [of cy
pres] as a general matter,” how to choose entities to receive the cy pres
award, whether new entities could be formed as part of the relief, how to
delineate responsibility between the judge and parties in forming the cy
pres remedy, and “how closely the goals of any enlisted organization must
correspond to the interests of the class.”66 As demonstrated by Chief Justice
Roberts’s statement accompanying this denial of certiorari, the law
regarding federal cy pres awards as part of class action settlement
agreements is in flux.
D.

Cy Pres Class Recovery and State Law

For purposes of this Note, it is necessary to examine two types of state
law that may conflict with federal cy pres law. First, unlike the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee, many state legislatures have explicitly codified
cy pres awards as a form of class action remedy that can be agreed to in a
settlement. These statutes differ in the type of remedy they allow, and
therefore the state statutes’ cy pres guidelines may conflict with federal cy
pres law’s flexible requirements. Second, every state has an unclaimed
property law allowing a state to collect property that goes unclaimed. In the
class action context, unclaimed settlement funds may be considered
unclaimed property. Thus, the question becomes whether unclaimed
settlement funds can be distributed to a cy pres recipient per federal law or
should escheat to the state based on the state’s unclaimed property statute.
62

Id. at 821.
Id. at 831 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
64
Id. at 834.
65
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013).
66
Id.
63
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1. State Cy Pres Laws.—Twenty-one states have codified specific
rules regarding cy pres awards.67 These state laws have varying levels of
restrictiveness.68 The states of Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin require that settlement funds be
disbursed to legal aid organizations.69 On the other hand, California,
Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee have
67

The states with codified cy pres rules are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See MEREDITH MCBURNEY, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGISLATION AND COURT RULES PROVIDING
FOR LEGAL AID TO RECEIVE CLASS ACTION RESIDUALS (2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ATJReports/ls_cypres.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GS7K-6XX3].
68
See Emily C. Baker & Lynsey M. Barron, Cy Pres . . . Say What? State Laws Governing
Disbursement of Residual Class-Action Funds, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/d5da170fe20d-4f96-aec1-12cf62115d70/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fbbc24cf-ffcd-43ed-98babe026d39ef17/cypres2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EG3-GEZ9] (“There is wide variation . . . in terms of
whether the cy pres statutes are mandatory, the default, or merely suggested.”).
69
See COLO. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent (50%) of the residual funds shall be
disbursed to the Colorado Lawyer Trust Account Foundation (COLTAF) to support activities and
programs that promote access to the civil justice system for low income residents of Colorado); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-807 (2017) (requiring that at least 50% of residual funds be disbursed to “eligible
organizations,” which must “promot[e] or provid[e] services that would be eligible for funding under
the Illinois Equal Justice Act”); IND. R. TRIAL P. 23(F)(2) (“[N]ot less than twenty-five percent (25%)
of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Indiana Bar Foundation to support the activities and
programs of the Indiana Pro Bono Commission and its pro bono districts.”); KY. R. CIV. P. 23.05(6)(b)
(“[N]ot less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Civil Rule 23
Account . . . to be allocated to the Kentucky Civil Legal Aid Organizations . . . to support activities and
programs that promote access to the civil justice system for low-income residents of Kentucky.”);
MONT. R. CIV. P. 23(i)(3) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent (50%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed
to an Access to Justice Organization to support activities and programs that promote access to the
Montana civil justice system.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.10(b) (2016) (“[T]he court . . . shall direct the
defendant to pay the sum of the unpaid residue . . . to the Indigent Person’s Attorney Fund and to the
North Carolina State Bar for the provision of civil legal services for indigents.”); OR. R. CIV. P. 32(O)
(“At least 50 percent of the amount not paid to class members [shall] be paid or delivered to the Oregon
State Bar for the funding of legal services provided through [Oregon’s] Legal Services Program . . . .”);
PA. R. CIV. P. 1716 (“Not less than fifty percent (50%) of residual funds in a given class action shall be
disbursed to the Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust Account Board to support activities and
programs which promote the delivery of civil legal assistance to the indigent in Pennsylvania by nonprofit corporations . . . .”); S.C. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent of residuals must be
distributed to the South Carolina Bar Foundation to support activities and programs that promote access
to the civil justice system for low income residents of South Carolina.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-257 (2017) (requiring that at least 50% of residual funds be disbursed “to the Commission on Equal
Access to Our Courts”); WIS. STAT. § 803.08(2) (2017) (“[N]ot less than fifty percent of the residual
funds shall be disbursed to [the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation] to support direct delivery of legal
services to persons of limited means in non-criminal matters.”); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 23(f)(2)
(“[N]ot less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Legal
Foundation of Washington to support activities and programs that promote access to the civil justice
system for low income residents of Washington State.”).
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codified cy pres awards but do not specify a particular charitable
organization to receive the funds; these states expressly allow—but do not
mandate—legal aid organizations to be the recipient.70 Finally, Connecticut,
Maine, and Nebraska have codified class action cy pres awards by
specifying particular legal aid charities to receive the award, but provide
the court and litigants discretion to choose a different charitable
organization that may do a better job of representing the interests of the
plaintiff class and may better serve as a second-best alternative to
compensating the class members directly.71
While the states which have codified specific rules regarding cy pres
give some direction as to distribution, they give no guidance as to whether
a federal court sitting in diversity should follow state or federal law. Thus,
if a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction in any of these twenty-one
states is confronted with a cy pres remedy, must the court follow the
specific requirements of the state law or the requirements of federal law?72
2. State Unclaimed Property Laws.—The other state law source of
guidance for distributing unclaimed settlement funds are unclaimed
property statutes. State unclaimed property laws require that holders of
certain types of intangible property give the property to the state if the
property is unclaimed for a specified time period.73 All fifty states and the

70

See CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 384(b) (providing that residual funds should be distributed “to
nonprofit organizations or foundations to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated
persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying cause of
action, to child advocacy programs, or to nonprofit organizations providing civil legal services to the
indigent”); HAW. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (providing that residual funds can be distributed to various nonprofit
organizations, including legal aid organizations); LA. SUP. CT. R. XLIII(2) (providing that cy pres funds
“may be disbursed . . . to one or more non-profit or governmental entities . . . including the Louisiana
Bar Foundation”); MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (providing that “residual funds . . . shall be disbursed to
one or more nonprofit organizations or foundations (which may include nonprofit organizations that
provide legal services to low income persons)”); N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 1-023(G)(2) (providing that
residual funds can be disbursed to, amongst other options, “nonprofit organizations that provide legal
services to low income persons”); TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.08 (providing that the “[d]istribution of residual
funds to a program or fund which serves the pro bono legal needs of Tennesseans . . . is permissable
[sic] but not required”).
71
See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 9-9(g)(2) (providing that residual funds should be disbursed
“for the purpose of funding those organizations that provide legal services for the poor in Connecticut”
absent a designation by the parties); ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2) (providing that residual funds should be
disbursed to the Maine Bar Foundation unless the parties agree on another entity to receive the funds);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319.01 (2017) (providing that residual funds should be paid to the Legal Aid and
Services Fund “unless [the court] orders otherwise to further the purposes of the underlying cause of
action”).
72
For a discussion of the answer to this question, see infra Parts III–V.
73
Ethan D. Millar & John L. Coalson, Jr., The Pot of Gold at the End of the Class Action Lawsuit:
Can States Claim It as Unclaimed Property?, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 511, 515 (2009).
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District of Columbia have unclaimed property laws.74 According to all of
the states’ unclaimed property laws, when the unclaimed property remits to
the state from the holder, the title of the property stays with the owner of
the unclaimed property, rather than with the state, and the owner of the
unclaimed property can always reclaim the property from the state.75 The
main purpose of unclaimed property laws is to help owners reclaim missing
property.76 However, courts have also recognized a secondary purpose: “to
give the state . . . the benefit of the use of the property until the owner
reclaims it (or never reclaims it).”77
In the class action settlement context, plaintiff class members are the
owners and the defendant is the holder of the unclaimed property—the
funds leftover in a settlement fund that were supposed to go to members of
the plaintiff class as specified in the settlement agreement.78 For purposes
of this Note, state unclaimed property laws are relevant in situations where
a federal district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, decides to distribute
unclaimed funds from a class action settlement fund to a charity or
nonprofit via a cy pres award despite the requirement of the relevant state’s
unclaimed property law that unclaimed property must remit to the state.79
II.

ERIE AND CHOICE OF LAW DOCTRINE

When a federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction, if one party believes
that the court should use federal law and the other party believes the court
should use state law, the federal court must decide which law should apply.
This decision has been and continues to be one of great confusion. For
purposes of this Note, it is necessary to understand the important myth
debunked by Chief Justice Warren in Hanna v. Plumer80 with respect to the
Erie doctrine. The myth stated that the Erie line of cases provided the
appropriate test to determine the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction where a Rule

74

Id.
Id. at 516 (“The state . . . acts as a mere custodian or conservator for the owner.”).
76
Id. at 516–17 (noting that the state must affirmatively try to find the owner of unclaimed
property, and if unsuccessful, must hold the property until the owner collects it).
77
Id. at 517 (citing cases).
78
Id. at 515.
79
See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2011). In this situation, a
state may argue that the court must apply the state’s unclaimed property law—requiring that unclaimed
funds be remitted to the state—rather than federal cy pres law. Id. at 332. The settling parties and cy
pres beneficiary, on the other hand, will likely argue that the court should apply federal law and allow
the cy pres distribution, specifically pointing to Rule 23(e) governing settlement agreements. Id. For a
discussion on this disagreement, see Parts III–IV.
80
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
75
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conflicts with state law.81 Professor John Ely masterfully articulated the
clear distinction drawn by Chief Justice Warren in this case:
[W]here there is no relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other Rule
promulgated pursuant to the [Rules] Enabling Act and the federal rule in issue
is therefore wholly judge-made, whether state or federal law should be applied
is controlled by the Rules of Decision Act, the statute construed in Erie and
York. Where the matter in issue is covered by a Federal Rule, however, the
Enabling Act—and not the Rules of Decision Act itself or the line of cases
construing it—constitutes the relevant standard.82

In other words, where one party argues that federal law controls, and the
other party argues that state law controls, the first question a federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction must ask is whether the federal law is
covered by a Federal Rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to
the Rules Enabling Act.
The subsequent analysis conducted by a court is dramatically different
depending on whether the question of federal law is controlled by a Federal
Rule. If there is no Federal Rule providing the federal standard—and
instead, the federal law in question stems from judge-made common law—
the Rules of Decision Act controls the court’s choice of law analysis. The
Rules of Decision Act states that “[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”83
On the other hand, if a Federal Rule does control the federal standard,
a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction need not consider the Rules
of Decision Act or the Court’s Erie line of cases in determining whether to
apply the state or federal law. Instead, the court must look to the Rules
Enabling Act, which states that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure [i.e., the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure] . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and
courts of appeals.”84 The Act requires that the Federal Rule “shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”85 Under a Rules Enabling
81

Id. at 469–70.
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974); see also Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (noting that when “no federal rule applies, a federal court must follow
the Rules of Decision Act . . . [b]ut when a situation is covered by a [F]ederal [R]ule, the Rules of
Decision Act inquiry by its own terms does not apply [and] [i]nstead, the Rules Enabling Act . . .
controls” (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471)).
83
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
84
Id. § 2072(a).
85
Id. § 2072(b).
82
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Act analysis, the court must first determine whether the Federal Rule
applies to the disputed issue, and then must determine whether the Rule
complies with the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act.86
This Part will discuss how a court is to determine whether the federal
law is controlled by a Federal Rule or judge-made common law. Then, this
Part will discuss the analytical steps a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction must perform to determine whether state or federal law governs
under either scenario.
A.

Choosing Between the Rules of Decision Act and Rules Enabling Act

Although Chief Justice Warren’s distinction between the Rules
Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act may seem clear, it requires an
additional line of analysis: courts must first actually determine whether the
issue is covered by a Federal Rule before determining whether to conduct a
Rules Enabling Act or Rules of Decision Act analysis.87 Generally, as one
scholar has stated, the court determines if a Federal Rule is “pertinent” to
the disputed issue.88 Often, a court asks whether the Rule is “sufficiently
broad” to “control” or “govern” the legal issue facing the court.89 Such a
determination is not as straightforward as one might expect.
On several occasions, the Court has held that the scope of the Federal
Rules is somewhat narrow. In other words, the Court has implied that when
there is doubt, it should be assumed that common law rather than the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure creates the federal standard, and thus, a
Rules of Decision Act analysis should be used.90 For example, in Gasperini
v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,91 a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction had to decide if it should use federal or state law in determining
whether to order a new trial based on an excessive jury verdict.92 New York
law allowed courts to order a new trial for excessive verdicts “when the
86

Robert J. Condlin, Is the Supreme Court Disabling the Enabling Act, or Is Shady Grove Just
Another Bad Opera?, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2016).
87
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion) (“The framework for
our decision [as to whether state or federal law should apply] is familiar. We must first determine
whether [the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] answers the question in dispute.”); Adam N. Steinman,
Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1131, 1145 (2011) (“Put simply, there is a difference between state law conflicting with a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure . . . and state law conflicting with the federal judiciary’s gloss on a Federal
Rule whose text provides only a vague or ambiguous standard . . . .”).
88
Condlin, supra note 86, at 1–2.
89
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–51 (1980).
90
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996); Walker, 446 U.S.
at 749–53.
91
518 U.S. 415.
92
Id. at 418–19.

1111

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

jury’s award ‘deviate[d] materially from what would be reasonable
compensation.’”93 By contrast, Federal Rule 59 governs motions for a new
trial in the case of an excessive jury verdict.94 But as the Court held, Rule
59 says nothing about the judicial standard to be used.95 The federal law
test used to determine whether compensation is excessive is the “shock the
conscience” test, a test that came from judge-made law.96 Thus, under
Hanna, the Court held that a Rules of Decision analysis was appropriate.97
On the other hand, however, the Court does not always hold such a
narrow view. In Hanna, for example, the Court determined that the Court
should only use a Rules of Decision Act analysis if the Federal Rule is
inapplicable to the federal law at issue.98 Likewise, in Shady Grove,99 the
Court faced the decision of whether a New York federal district court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction must follow Federal Rule 23, which permits
class certification in all cases so long as one of the 23(a) and one of the
23(b)(3) requirements are met,100 or instead follow a New York statute,
which completely bars class actions for penalty interest cases.101 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court.102 First, writing for a five-Justice

93

Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
95
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22.
96
Id. at 429.
97
Id. at 437 n.22; see Adam N. Steinman, Kryptonite for CAFA?, 32 REV. LITIG. 649, 675 (2013)
(noting that the Gasperini Court held that “[t]he shock-the-conscience standard was a kind of federal
procedural common law, not a standard dictated by Rule 59 itself”). For an additional Supreme Court
decision holding that a Rules of Decision Act analysis should be used where there is a judicially created
standard regarding a Federal Rule, see Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–53 (1980)
(holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 does not cover the choice of law issue of when a statute
of limitations begins to run, and thus employed a Rules of Decision Act analysis).
98
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–71 (1965); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“We do not wade into Erie’s murky
waters unless the Federal Rule is inapplicable or invalid.” (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–71)).
99
559 U.S. 393.
100
See id. at 398 (noting that Rule 23 allows a “‘class action [to] be maintained’ if two conditions
are met”: (1) the suit satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (2) fits into one of the categories of
Rule 23(b) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23)).
101
Id. at 398–99; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2017) (“Unless a statute creating or
imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a
class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by
statute may not be maintained as a class action.”).
102
Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and
Justice Stevens, a five-person majority, for Part II.A of his opinion which discussed whether the federal
law was controlled by Rule 23. For the rest of his opinion, however, Justice Scalia did not garner a
majority. For Parts II.B and II.D, Justice Scalia was joined by only Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor, and for Part II.C, Justice Scalia was joined by only Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas.
94
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majority, Justice Scalia held that Rule 23 and § 901(b) do in fact conflict.103
The majority also held that Rule 23, rather than judicial common law,
governed the federal law at issue.104 Thus, according to a majority of the
Court, a Rules Enabling Act analysis was appropriate. Even though Justice
Scalia could only garner a plurality for the rest of his opinion,105 unlike the
majority opinions in Walker and Gasperini, the Court in Shady Grove held
that a Federal Rule was broad enough to trigger a Rules Enabling Act
analysis and displace the state law.
In Shady Grove, the Federal Rule was found to control even though
some of the Rule 23 requirements are anything but clear. For example, the
class action at issue in Shady Grove—like most controversial class
actions—invokes Rule 23(b)(3), requiring that “questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”106 As one
scholar recognizes, the terms “predominate” and “superior” are particularly
vague; there is “no precise formula” for how a court should determine
predominance and superiority, “and the text of Rule 23 provides no
answers.”107 Instead, federal courts develop common law to define these
terms. This judge-made federal law could take either a more hostile or a
more tolerant position toward class action certification than state law.108
Nevertheless, as noted above, a majority of the Court joined Justice
Scalia’s opinion holding that Rule 23 “answers the question in dispute.”109

103

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 399 (holding that Rule 23 and § 901(b) “attempt[]
to answer the same question,” whether the suit “may not be maintained as a class action because of the
relief it seeks” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Shady Grove dissent, by contrast, held that
“Rule 23 does not collide with § 901(b) . . . [because] Rule 23 prescribes the considerations relevant to
class certification and postcertification proceedings—but it does not command that a particular remedy
be available when a party sues in a representative capacity.” Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
other words, Justice Ginsburg argued that “Rule 23 governs procedural aspects of class litigation” while
the New York state statute “control[s] the size of [the] monetary award a class plaintiff may pursue.” Id.
at 446–47.
104
Id. at 406 (majority opinion) (“Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal
civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites are met.”).
105
While both Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion and Justice Stevens’s concurrence determined that
Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling Act, Justice Stevens took an approach more deferential to
state law. See Steinman, supra note 87, at 1140–41; see also infra note 134.
106
FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
107
Steinman, supra note 87, at 1145.
108
Id.
109
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion); see Condlin, supra note
86, at 26; Steinman, supra note 87, at 1138.
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Such an approach may suggest that the scope of the Federal Rules may be
broader than it appeared after Gasperini and Walker.110
B.

Conducting Rules of Decision Act and Rules Enabling Act Analyses

After determining whether judge-made common law or a Federal Rule
controls the federal law, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must
conduct a Rules of Decision Act analysis (for judge-made common law) or
a Rules Enabling Act analysis (for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure) and
determine whether the federal or state law should apply.
First, to determine whether the Rules of Decision Act requires a
federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction to use state law, courts rely on
the Erie line of cases.111 In Hanna, the Court developed the “modified
outcome determination test”;112 under this approach, a court analyzes a
Rules of Decision Act question based on “the twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.”113 The Hanna modified outcome determination
test replaced the former Guaranty Trust Co. v. York “outcomedetermination” test,114 which required the court to ask whether “it
significantly affect[ed] the result of a litigation for a federal court to
disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a State court.”115 While the Hanna Court
described the modified outcome determination test as having “twin aims,”
in reality, the test comes down to the single concern: whether the difference
in outcome from using the state as opposed to federal law would result in
an unfair result to the litigants.116 If the difference in outcome would result
110

See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.
See Ely, supra note 82, at 698. This line of cases began in 1938, when the Court held that where
federal law and state law conflict, under the Rules of Decision Act a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938). The Court’s Erie decision overruled the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, which allowed federal courts to
apply their own federal common law. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
112
Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 360 (1977) (referring to the Hanna test as the “modified
outcome determination test”).
113
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
114
Id. at 468; see Redish & Phillips, supra note 112, at 362.
115
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
116
See Redish & Phillips, supra note 112, at 373 (“While the Court identified [the twin aims of
Erie] as distinct, it seems clear that its focus reduces to a single concern: fairness to the litigants . . .
[and] how forum shopping brings about unfairness or inequality.”); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (stating that the Court must determine whether using federal
law would “have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to
[apply] it would [unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or] be likely to cause a
plaintiff to choose the federal court” (alteration in original) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9)).
111
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in an unfair result, under the modified outcome determination test, the court
must defer to state law.117
Nearly twenty years after Hanna, Justice Ginsburg further
complicated the analysis. In Gasperini,118 Justice Ginsburg invoked Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc..119 The Byrd case, decided
seven years prior to Hanna, involved the question of whether a factual
issue should be decided by a judge, per state law, or by a jury, per federal
law.120 In Byrd, the Court created a balancing test to examine Rules of
Decision Act questions. The Court considered (1) the state’s interest in
state substantive policy serving as controlling law in diversity cases,121 (2)
the federal interest in using federal procedure in federal courts,122 and (3)
the litigant’s interest in not having the outcome turn on whether the case is
adjudicated in federal or state court,123 and then balanced those three
interests.124
In Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg held that an “‘outcome-determination
test’ was an insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal
interests.”125 According to Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation, based on the
Court’s holding in Byrd, countervailing federal interests are at play where
the diversity suit involves “the allocation of trial functions between judge
and jury” or “the allocation of authority to review verdicts.”126 Justice
Ginsburg held that in these situations, where the distribution of factfinding
responsibility between the judge and the jury is at issue, instead of simply
looking to whether there is an impact on fairness to the litigants, the Byrd
balancing test is appropriate.127

117

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–68.
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
119
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
120
Id. at 533–34.
121
Id. at 535–36 (examining whether the procedure at dispute was “bound up” with the substantive
state “rights and obligations” of the parties being enforced).
122
Id. at 538 (examining the federal interest in using the federal procedure and requiring a jury).
123
Id. at 537 (examining whether “the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the
issue . . . is decided by a judge or a jury”).
124
See Redish & Phillips, supra note 112, at 362–63. For a discussion of three possible approaches
to the Byrd balancing approach, see id. at 364–66.
125
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996).
126
Id.
127
See id. at 431–32; see also LINDA MULLENIX, MARTIN REDISH & GEORGENE VAIRO,
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND JURISDICTION 680–81 (2d ed. 2015) (noting that when an Erie
issue involves the functions of the judge and the jury, the Byrd balancing test applies); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a
Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 1014 (1998)
(recognizing that when the allocation of power between the judge and jury is in dispute, the analysis
118

1115

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

On the other hand, the analysis of an issue contained in the Federal
Rules under the Rules Enabling Act is quite different. When a court
determines that an issue is controlled by a Federal Rule, the federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the federal law rather than state
law unless the Federal Rule violates the Rules Enabling Act or the
Constitution.128 In other words, the court must apply the Federal Rule so
long as the Rule is a “rule[] of practice and procedure” and does “not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”129 Only if the Rule
violates the Rules Enabling Act will the court apply state law. Because the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated and approved by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Judicial Conference, and the
Supreme Court, the rules have a presumption of validity.130 In Burlington
Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the case that established the current Rules
Enabling Act analysis standard,131 the Court held that if a Federal Rule is
“reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of th[e] system of rules,”
then even a Rule that “incidentally affect[s] litigants’ substantive rights
do[es] not violate [the Rules Enabling Act].”132 The Burlington Northern
test is very deferential to the Federal Rules. Indeed, the Court has “rejected
every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before [it].”133 If
the Supreme Court were to hold that a Federal Rule was in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act, it would be forced to invalidate a Rule it chose to
promulgate. Such an outcome is highly unlikely. Thus, when a court
determines that a Federal Rule controls the federal law, the analysis is
almost always over before it begins, and the court will almost certainly
apply the federal law.

should include a balancing of whether the state rule is “bound up” with substantive state rights and
whether there is a strong federal interest in using federal procedure).
128
Steinman, supra note 97, at 664.
129
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) (“Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts . . . but it has never essayed to
declare the substantive state law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
130
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987).
131
For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions describing a Rules Enabling Act analysis prior
to Burlington Northern, see Condlin, supra note 86, at 5–20.
132
Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s
substantive rights; most procedural rules do.”).
133
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion); see Condlin, supra note
86, at 3 (“[T]he Supreme Court never has found a Federal Rule invalid . . . .”); Millar & Coalson, supra
note 73, at 540–41 (“Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are entitled to a strong presumption of validity
[and] [i]n fact, no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure has ever been declared invalid under either the U.S.
Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act.”).
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It is also critical to stress that unlike a Rules of Decision Act analysis,
when performing a Rules Enabling Act analysis, courts are generally not
concerned with the state law at issue or the state law’s substantive or
procedural purpose. “[T]he validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely
upon whether it regulates procedure,” and if it does, it is valid “regardless
of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.”134 Thus, that a state law
may conflict with the federal law is wholly irrelevant to the analysis.
The remainder of this Note explores whether a federal court sitting in
diversity jurisdiction would likely use state or federal law in determining
the validity of a cy pres award to distribute unclaimed settlement funds
where the state and federal law conflict. Part III, consistent with the Court’s
precedent in Gasperini, hypothesizes that courts will determine that the
standard for enforcement of cy pres is one of judicial common law, and
thus conduct a Rules of Decision Act analysis. Part IV, on the other hand,
suggests that a Rules Enabling Act analysis is more appropriate because cy
pres awards are derived from Rule 23(e), consistent with Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Shady Grove. As will be discussed, the two analyses lead to
different results. If a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction uses a
Rules of Decision Act to analyze a conflict between federal and state law,
the result will depend on the nature of the conflict—whether the federal
law conflicts with a state cy pres statute or a state unclaimed property
statute. By contrast, if a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction uses a
Rules Enabling Act analysis, the court is likely to apply federal law.
Finally, Part V will argue that the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s April 2015
proposal to codify cy pres awards as a part of Rule 23(e)—and the
Subcommittee’s subsequent withdrawal of the proposal in November
2015—lends support to the argument that cy pres awards are in fact derived
from Rule 23(e) and may even violate the Rules Enabling Act.
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion); see also MULLENIX ET
supra note 127, at 670 (“The [Shady Grove] Court emphasized that for purposes of [a Rules
Enabling Act] analysis, it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the affected state law
that matters, but rather the substantive or procedural nature of the federal rule.”). Note, however, that in
his Shady Grove concurrence, Justice Stevens suggested an “application of the [Rules] Enabling Act
[that] shows sensitivity” to the state law. 559 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Stevens concluded that sometimes a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the state procedural rule; he stated that a
AL.,

[F]ederal [R]ule . . . cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law
that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or
remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right. And absent a governing
federal rule, a federal court must engage in the traditional Rules of Decision Act inquiry, under
the Erie line of cases.
Id. at 423–24.
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III.

THE LIKELY APPROACH: A RULES OF DECISION ACT ANALYSIS

It is likely that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction would
conduct a Rules of Decision Act analysis to determine whether federal or
state cy pres law should apply where they conflict. First, the court would
likely determine that federal common law—not Rule 23(e)—governs cy
pres awards. Judges have created requirements to determine the validity of
cy pres remedies. Second, the court would conduct a Rules of Decision Act
analysis using the modified outcome determination test.
A.

The Argument That Judge-Made Common Law
Governs Cy Pres Awards

The argument that a Rules of Decision Act analysis applies would
start by highlighting that federal cy pres doctrine in the class action context
developed through judge-made common law, and therefore, cy pres awards
are not controlled by Rule 23(e)(2). It would point to the fact that Rule
23(e) does not define any specific test to determine whether a settlement
involving a cy pres award is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”135 Instead,
according to this line of reasoning, courts have created common law
requirements, and “judicial interpretation differs [in applying these
requirements], resulting in confusion and inconsistent outcomes.”136
First, judges have created a “trigger requirement,” requiring some
difficulty in distributing settlement awards to class members in order to
justify a cy pres remedy.137 Courts vary, however, in how challenging
effective distribution of funds to the actual class members must be. For
example, some courts require that it be “infeasible” to compensate actual
class members before providing a cy pres award to a nonprofit
organization,138 while others have no such requirement.139
Second, courts have designed a “nexus requirement,” mandating
“there be a connection—or nexus—between the harm that the plaintiffs

135

Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3252; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
Bartholomew, supra note 3, at 3252.
137
Id. at 3252–53.
138
See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that a settlement
agreement including a $1.13 million cy pres award to the Orthopedic Research and Education
Foundation was invalid because it was feasible to mail $3 checks to each of the plaintiffs); In re Matzo
Food Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 605 (D.N.J. 1994) (“Typically, the court employs cy pres where . . .
distribution [is] economically impossible.”).
139
See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that it is
not the job of the court “to determine whether the settlement is the fairest possible resolution” and thus
declining “to hold that cy pres distributions are only appropriate” where further individual distributions
are economically infeasible).
136
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have suffered and the benefit the cy pres distribution will provide.”140 For
instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that to meet the nexus requirement, “[a]
cy pres award must be guided by (1) the objectives of the underlying
statute(s),” “(2) the interests of the silent class members,” and (3) “must not
benefit a group too remote from the plaintiff class.”141 In contrast, the Third
Circuit recently added the requirement that courts must evaluate cy pres
awards as part of a class settlement based on “the degree of direct benefit
provided to the class.”142 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has held
that cy pres remedies lacking any direct or indirect benefits to the class
could be valid.143
Advocates for a Rules of Decision Act analysis would also point to
Supreme Court precedent that takes a narrow approach to interpreting the
Federal Rules.144 They would contend that the judge-made trigger and
nexus requirement tests used to determine whether a cy pres settlement is
fair under Rule 23(e) are akin to the shock the conscience test used to
determine whether a verdict is excessive as to warrant a new trial under
Rule 59 in Gasperini.145 Therefore, a court could reason that just as the
Court in Gasperini held that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction
should use a Rules of Decision Act analysis to determine whether to apply
federal or state law in the context of a motion for new trial due to excessive
damages, so too should a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction use a
Rules of Decision Act analysis to determine whether to apply federal or
state law in the context of evaluating the validity of a cy pres award as an
aspect of a class action settlement agreement.
The Fifth Circuit—the only federal appellate court to examine a
conflict of federal and state law relating to a cy pres award—determined

140

RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 12.33; see also id. § 12.33 n.3 (discussing circuit and district court
cases requiring a nexus from the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).
141
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2011). This nexus
requirement focuses on the purpose of the statute rather than the specific claim. In other words, “it is
enough for a charitable distribution to advance judicial access or consumer protection research; the
distribution’s use need not perfectly align with the specific facts of the case.” Bartholomew, supra note
3, at 3254–55.
142
Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d at 174 (emphasis added). The court held that in
evaluating direct benefit, it can consider “among other things, the number of individual awards
compared to both the number of claims and the estimated number of class members, the size of the
individual awards compared to claimants’ estimated damages, and the claims process used to determine
individual awards.” Id.
143
See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013).
144
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s narrow interpretation of Rule
59 in Gasperini and Rule 3 in Walker).
145
See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
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that cy pres was governed by judge-made common law.146 Thus, to
determine if state or federal law should apply, the court utilized a Rules of
Decision Act analysis. The court stressed that “Rule 23(e) . . . contains no
categorical rule entitling plaintiffs to cy pres distribution—and, in fact,
does not mention cy pres distribution at all.”147 The Rule “merely
empowers a district court to approve a settlement [and] does not mention
the district court’s discretion—or even its authority—to extinguish the right
of recovery of identified class members through a later cy pres order.”148
Other courts may well follow the Fifth Circuit’s lead in future cases
examining conflicts between state and federal law.
B.

Rules of Decision Act Analysis

If a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction decides that a Rules of
Decision Act analysis is appropriate, as it likely would, it would use the
modified outcome determination test to decide whether federal or state law
should apply. Courts must examine whether the difference in outcome from
using state or federal law would meaningfully impact forum shopping or
result in an inequitable administration of justice.149 Federal law regarding
the issue of cy pres remedies as a class action settlement may conflict with
two different kinds of state laws: state cy pres statutes or state unclaimed
property statutes. Under a Rules of Decision Act analysis, the answer to
whether state or federal law should apply would depend on the specific
nature of the conflict.
First, twenty-one states have cy pres statutes that codify specific
requirements for cy pres awards as a part of a class action settlement
agreement.150 Some state statutes mandate that unclaimed settlement funds
be distributed as a cy pres remedy to legal aid organizations.151 Other state
statutes codify cy pres awards as valid forms of class action relief but do
not designate specific legal aid charities as recipients.152 These requirements
may conflict with the federal common law requirements for cy pres
remedies. Depending on the language of each specific state statute, the
146

All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 333.
148
Id. at 334.
149
See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. The issue of whether a cy pres remedy is an
available option as part of a settlement agreement does not impact the judge–jury allocation of power.
Therefore, the Byrd balancing test is not appropriate.
150
See supra Section II.D.1.
151
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin).
152
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Tennessee).
147
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statute may or may not require a “trigger” or “nexus” between the absent
class members and the charity organization. Moreover, federal cy pres
rules, unlike some state statutes, do not require or suggest specific legal aid
charities as recipients and do not place minimums on the percent of
unclaimed settlement funds that must be disbursed to the specified
organization.
Despite the difference between federal and state cy pres law, under the
modified outcome determination test, it is likely that where federal cy pres
law and a state cy pres statute conflict, a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction would use federal law. The difference in outcome from using
federal law as opposed to the state law is unlikely to lead to unfair
treatment of the litigants and unlikely to impact forum shopping or result in
an inequitable administration of justice. As long as some sort of cy pres
award is available to plaintiffs as an option for settlement, the outcome for
the plaintiff class will be largely the same: a sizeable settlement involving a
cy pres award. The only difference may be what specific organization
receives the cy pres award. Moreover, while some state statutes—unlike
federal cy pres law—mandate cy pres awards, they do so out of the
proportion of settlement funds that go unclaimed. Those distinctions are
unlikely to matter to plaintiffs, to meaningfully impact forum shopping, or
to result in an inequitable administration of justice.
The second possible conflict between state and federal law in the cy
pres context involves state unclaimed property laws. Every state has an
unclaimed property statute.153 In instances where funds remain after
settlement, courts must determine whether to distribute the funds as a cy
pres award to the charitable organization specified in the settlement or to
allocate the funds to the state based on the unclaimed property law. The
Fifth Circuit confronted such a conflict in All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants,154
a class action antitrust lawsuit filed against various oil companies.155 The
parties agreed to a settlement, but there were over $10 million of unclaimed
funds due to uncashed checks, checks returned as undeliverable, and
settlement awards that were of a de minimis amount.156 The district court
distributed the leftover funds through a cy pres remedy to the Center for
Energy and Environmental Resources at the University of Texas.157 The
issue in the case was whether the unclaimed funds should have instead
been governed by Texas’s Unclaimed Property Act and therefore been
153
154
155
156
157

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
645 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 331.
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returned to the state.158 If the court instead were to honor the cy pres
agreement under federal law, it would be forced to ignore the state statute
governing unclaimed property.
The Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 23(e) does not govern federal
cy pres doctrine159 and instead conducted a Rules of Decision Act analysis.
And under a Rules of Decision Act analysis, the court held that the state
unclaimed property act must apply, and the unclaimed settlement funds
therefore must escheat to the state.160 The court analyzed forum shopping
and inequitable administration of justice as part of Hanna’s “twin aims”
test.161 First, the court summarily concluded that “the availability of cy pres
does not pose a significant threat of forum-shopping by plaintiffs.”162 This
part of the court’s analysis leaves something to be desired. It is possible, for
example, that if federal cy pres law, and not a state’s unclaimed property
law, applied in federal courts, parties could seek to litigate in federal court
to avoid any possible impact that an unclaimed property law may have in
settlement negotiations.163
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit correctly determined that “permitting
federal courts to disregard the Unclaimed Property Act in favor of cy pres
distribution, while state courts follow the Act, would lead to the inequitable
administration of justice.”164 As the court held, if the federal court could
apply federal cy pres law and disregard Texas’s unclaimed property act,
“identified class members who would have a right to recover their property
from the State under the Act would instead lose that right of recovery
forever . . . solely because the case was in federal court.”165 In addition, the
court stressed that Texas’s possessory interest in the unclaimed funds
would be extinguished, and Texas would lose its “enforceable property
right in the income from [the] unclaimed property,” again purely because

158

Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 72.001–74.710 (West 2016).
All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 333–35.
160
Id. at 337.
161
Id. at 336. The Fifth Circuit, however, misinterpreted Gasperini, incorrectly concluding that the
Byrd balancing test functioned “side by side” with Hanna. Id. The court failed to recognize that Justice
Ginsburg specified a specific situation where the Byrd test is applicable: when judge–jury allocation of
power was at issue. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. Thus, the court’s consideration of
Byrd balancing, see All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 337, was in error. In any event, the court’s Byrd
discussion was brief and did not impact the court’s analysis of forum shopping and the inequitable
administration of justice; therefore, it did not appear to influence its opinion.
162
All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 336.
163
See Millar & Coalson, supra note 73, at 545 (noting though that “such a prospect is dubious at
best”).
164
All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 337.
165
Id.
159
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the “case happened to be settled in federal, rather than state, court.”166 The
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is sound, and the court was correct that this
situation presented an “inequitable administration of justice.”167 Put simply,
if the court were to use federal rather than state law, the difference in
outcome would cause “an unfair result to the litigants.”168 Therefore, under
a Rules of Decision Act analysis, a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction should honor state unclaimed property statutes, even at the
expense of disregarding a settlement containing a cy pres award that would
otherwise be valid under federal law.
AN ALTERNATE APPROACH: RULES ENABLING ACT ANALYSIS

IV.

In contrast to the Rules of Decision Act analysis discussed in Part III,
it is more appropriate for a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction to
use a Rules Enabling Act analysis to determine whether to apply federal or
state law where they conflict on the issue of class action cy pres remedies.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) clearly outlines the requirements for
class action settlements. All aspects of a class action settlement, including a
cy pres award, must comply with the Rule. Under a Rules Enabling Act
analysis, it is likely a federal court would apply federal cy pres law, honor
the settlement agreement, and disregard a state’s cy pres law or unclaimed
property act.
A.

The Argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
Governs Cy Pres Awards

When adversarial parties agree to a cy pres award, the plaintiff class
and defendants must agree to the arrangement by a formal settlement
agreement. Thus, before a court permits such a settlement, including a cy
pres award, they must ensure that all requirements of Rule 23(e) are met.
Most notably, the court must determine whether the settlement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” in accordance with Rule 23(e)(2).169 Therefore,
under the principle that the greater includes the lesser, where a settlement
includes a cy pres remedy, Rule 23(e)(2) governs a court’s decision in

166

Id. It is relevant to note that this part of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis considers the “inequitable
administration of justice” prong of the Hanna test with respect to a nonparty, the state of Texas. While
acknowledging that “some aspects of the ‘twin aims’ analysis—in particular, the focus on forum
shopping—seem better suited to disputes between plaintiffs and defendants, rather than those involving
post-judgment intervenors,” the Court was nevertheless willing to consider Texas’s interest as part of its
analysis. Id.
167
Id.
168
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
169
FED R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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judging the validity of the cy pres award. A cy pres award must also be
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.”170
As the Court held in Shady Grove, “Rule 23 provides a one size-fitsall formula for deciding the class-action question.”171 In Shady Grove, the
Court used a Rules Enabling Act analysis despite the vagueness of Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements and despite the fact
that federal common law governs their interpretation.172 Likewise, a federal
court should use a Rules Enabling Act analysis despite the vagueness in
Rule 23(e)(2)’s requirement that settlements and cy pres awards are “fair,
reasonable and adequate” and despite the fact that federal common law
governs the validity of cy pres awards. Thus, where federal cy pres law
conflicts with state law, a court need not “wade into Erie’s murky
waters.”173 Instead, it must simply determine whether Rule 23(e) is
consistent with the Rules Enabling Act.174
Moreover, Rule 23(e) clearly conflicts with both state cy pres statutes
and state unclaimed property acts. Rule 23(e) sets the requirements for all
class action settlements, including distribution of leftover funds as cy pres
awards. The conflict with state cy pres statutes, which also set out the
requirements for the distribution of leftover funds as cy pres awards, is
clear. The conflict with state unclaimed property acts is less obvious, but
still present. Both Rule 23(e) and state unclaimed property laws “attempt[]
to answer the same question”175: what to do with unclaimed funds after a
class action settlement agreement.
B.

Rules Enabling Act Analysis

As discussed in Part II, courts are extremely hesitant to declare that a
Federal Rule violates the Rules Enabling Act. The Supreme Court has
never invalidated a Federal Rule and largely defers to the judgment of the
Rules Advisory Committee.176 Thus, if a court were to glean cy pres awards

170

See Millar & Coalson, supra note 73, at 538 (“If a court has the discretion to approve (or
disapprove) a settlement based on its fairness and reasonableness, then the court necessarily has the
power to approve each of the provisions in the settlement agreement—including those involving the
treatment of unclaimed settlement proceeds.”).
171
559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010) (plurality opinion).
172
See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
173
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion).
174
If at some point in the future, a specific cy pres provision is added to Rule 23(e) similar to the
Rule 23 Subcommittee April 2015 proposal, see infra note 182 and accompanying text, a federal court
would definitely conduct a Rules Enabling Act analysis. The Subcommittee’s subsequent withdrawal of
the proposed amendment has interesting implications. See infra Part V.
175
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 399 (plurality opinion).
176
See supra Section II.A.2.
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from Rule 23(e), it is likely that a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction would apply the federal law. As the Court held in Shady Grove,
Rule 23 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act because “[a] class
action . . . merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple
parties.”177 Therefore, Rule 23 regulates procedure such that any impact on
substantive law would be incidental. Likewise, a court specifically
examining the validity of Rule 23(e) would likely, almost by default,
determine that Rule 23(e) is a procedural tool to permit class action
settlement agreements. It would likely find that any impact Rule 23(e) has
on substantive law would be incidental to that purpose, and therefore,
comply with the Rules Enabling Act under the Burlington Northern test.178
Under this analysis, a federal court would approve any settlement
agreement between class action plaintiffs and defendants consistent with
Rule 23(e), including any cy pres agreement that it determines is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate.” State law would not bind a federal court sitting
in diversity jurisdiction. Thus, a federal court would not be obligated to
follow a state cy pres statute’s specific guidelines—for example, the
mandate that funds go to legal aid charities.179 Similarly, a federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction would not be obligated to adhere to the
terms of a state’s unclaimed property statute and would not be obligated to
escheat unclaimed settlement funds to the state.180 The court would not
concern itself with the substantive or procedural purposes behind the state
laws. Instead, the court would just need to ensure that the settlement—
including the cy pres award that is a part of the settlement—complies with
the broad guidelines of Rule 23(e). Any substantive impact that a particular
settlement and its terms would have on state cy pres or unclaimed property
law is irrelevant under this analysis because a court would likely determine
that it is incidental to the procedural purpose of Rule 23(e).
V.

THE IMPACT OF THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE’S PROPOSAL—
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL

In April 2015, the Rule 23 Subcommittee proposed an amendment to
Rule 23(e) to explicitly codify cy pres remedies; the proposed Rule
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting, in
dicta, that a cy pres award as a part of a settlement does not violate the Rules Enabling Act because the
“certification of a settlement simply recognizes the parties’ deliberate decision to bind themselves
according to mutually agreed-upon terms without engaging in any substantive adjudication of the
underlying causes of action” (quoting Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011))).
179
For state-specific cy pres statutes, see supra notes 67–71.
180
Every state has an unclaimed property statute. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
178
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23(e)(3) would have allowed federal courts to “approve a [settlement]
proposal that includes a cy pres remedy.”181 The proposal provided specific
guidelines as to when a cy pres award would, and would not, be
appropriate:
(A) If individual class members can be identified through reasonable effort,
and the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distributions
economically viable, settlement proceeds must be distributed directly to
individual class members;
(B) If the proposal involves individual distributions to class members and
funds remain after distributions, the settlement must provide for further
distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are
too small to make individual distributions economically viable or other
specific reasons exist that would make such further distributions impossible or
unfair;
(C) The proposal may provide that, if the court finds that individual
distributions are not viable under Rule 23(e)(3)(A) or (B), a cy pres approach
may be employed if it directs payment to a recipient whose interests
reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class.182

Ultimately, the Rule 23 Subcommittee opted to remove the cy pres
amendment from its agenda.183 Nevertheless, the proposal—and its
withdrawal—provide two key insights into the way in which a federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction should analyze a conflict between federal
and state law involving a cy pres award as part of a class action settlement:
(1) Rule 23(e) governs cy pres awards and (2) courts should more closely
examine whether cy pres awards violate the Rules Enabling Act.
First, the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s proposal demonstrates that Rule
23(e) in fact governs cy pres awards, notwithstanding the Subcommittee’s
subsequent failure to enact the proposal. There is a reason that the
Subcommittee went straight to Rule 23(e) to codify class action cy pres
remedies. It recognized that the modern class action cy pres award is an
aspect of a class action settlement that the court must approve based on
Rule 23(e)’s requirements. The Subcommittee’s initial desire to amend
Rule 23(e) leaves little doubt that cy pres remedies are “covered by one of
the Federal Rules.”184 Therefore, “the question facing the court [sitting in
diversity jurisdiction] is a far cry from the typical . . . Erie choice,”185 but
instead is an examination of whether Rule 23(e) violates the Rules
181
182
183
184
185
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Enabling Act. A Rules Enabling Act analysis—and not a Rules of Decision
Act analysis—is appropriate.
Although it is true that Federal Rules have a strong presumption of
validity,186 the decision to analyze an issue under the Rules Enabling Act
rather than the Rules of Decision Act “is by no means to concede the
validity of all Federal Rules, for the Enabling Act contains significant
limiting language of its own.”187 The Rules Enabling Act limits the Rules
by providing that they “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”188 Professor Ely has suggested that the Court in Hanna recognized
that the “Enabling Act constitutes the only check on the Rules—that ‘Erie’
does not stand there as a backstop,” and therefore, that courts should “take
the Act’s limiting language more seriously than it has in the past.”189
Professor Martin Redish has argued that cy pres awards violate the
Rules Enabling Act.190 According to Professor Redish, “[s]ubstantive laws
necessarily contain two elements: a behavioral proscription and an
enforcement mechanism.”191 The behavioral proscription is the aspect of a
law that regulates behavior.192 The enforcement mechanism, on the other
hand, compensates injured parties and provides punitive remedies to
wrongdoers.193 Professor Redish contends that a Rule 23(e) settlement that
includes a cy pres award transforms a substantive right: it modifies the
enforcement mechanism of the underlying substantive law from one of
compensating plaintiffs to one imposing of civil fines on defendants.194
Several lower federal courts have recognized Professor Redish’s
concerns.195
The Rule 23 Subcommittee, in deciding to withdrawal its proposal to
codify cy pres as part of Rule 23(e), explicitly identified the Rules Enabling
186

See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
Ely, supra note 82, at 698.
188
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
189
Ely, supra note 82, at 698.
190
See Redish et. al., supra note 4, at 644–48.
191
Id. at 644.
192
Id. at 644–45.
193
Id. at 645.
194
Id. at 647 (“[I]nvocation of cy pres in the class action context alters substantially the DNA of
the underlying substantive law . . . .”).
195
See, e.g., Klier v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones,
J., concurring) (“Cy pres distributions arguably violate the Rules Enabling Act by using a wholly
procedural device—the class-action mechanism as prescribed in Rule 23—to transform substantive law
‘from a compensatory remedial structure to the equivalent of a civil fine.’” (quoting Redish et al., supra
note 4, at 623)); In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 885 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1110–11 (D.N.M.
2012) (holding that “cy pres awards are a bad idea and inappropriate,” and citing favorably Professor
Redish’s critique of cy pres awards—including the Rules Enabling Act concerns).
187
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Act concern. In explaining its decision, the Subcommittee noted that
“adopting such a provision would raise genuine [Rules] Enabling Act
concerns,” and thus concluded that “uneasiness about the proper limits of
the rulemaking authority cautioned against adopting a freestanding
provision on cy pres provisions.”196 In other words, the Subcommittee
withdrew its proposal in order to maintain the status quo and allow federal
courts to continue to enforce cy pres remedies as part of settlement
agreements without the risk of Rules Enabling Act scrutiny. The
Subcommittee likely realized that explicitly codifying cy pres awards in
Rule 23 would eliminate any doubt that cy pres remedies must be examined
under the Rules Enabling Act, and would make Rule 23(e)’s potential
violation of the Enabling Act too obvious to ignore.197
Courts should not ignore Rules Enabling Act concerns merely because
the Subcommittee withdrew the proposal. Instead, a federal court sitting in
diversity jurisdiction, presented with a conflict between federal cy pres law
and a state cy pres or unclaimed property statute, should still recognize that
federal cy pres law derives from Rule 23(e). Thus, it should use a Rules
Enabling Act rather than a Rules of Decision Act analysis. And despite the
withdrawal, the court should examine the validity of cy pres remedies with
a keen eye and seriously consider the Rules Enabling Act concerns
identified by Professor Redish, several lower federal courts, and the
Subcommittee itself.
CONCLUSION
A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction may confront a
situation in which it must determine the validity of a settlement containing
a cy pres award. If the state in which the court sits has its own cy pres or
unclaimed property statute, the court must first determine whether federal
or state law applies. There is a lack of clarity as to whether cy pres awards
should be derived from Rule 23(e) or federal judge-made common law, and
therefore, it is unclear whether courts should use a Rules Enabling Act or
Rules of Decision Act analysis in determining whether to apply federal or
state law. But following the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s suggestion in April
2015 to explicitly add a cy pres award provision to Rule 23(e), there is no
longer a question. Courts should interpret cy pres awards as derived from
and controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, because the
Subcommittee rescinded their suggestion in November 2015 due to Rules
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For an in-depth discussion of the Rules Enabling Act concerns, see Redish et al., supra note 4,
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Enabling Act concerns, courts should recognize that Rules Enabling Act
concerns are legitimate.
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